Open futures, human finitude. by Evans,  M.
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
30 April 2015
Version of attached ﬁle:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Evans, M. (2013) 'Open futures, human ﬁnitude.', in Medical humanities companion : prognosis. London:
Radcliﬀe Publishing, pp. 105-120.
Further information on publisher's website:
http://www.radcliﬀehealth.com/shop/medical-humanities-companion-volume-4-prognosis
Publisher's copyright statement:
This is an Accepted Manuscript of a book chapter published by Routledge in Medical humanities companion :
prognosis on 31 December 2013 available online: https://www.crcpress.com/Medical-Humanities-Companion-Volume-
4/Gordon-MacNaughton-Rudeback/p/book/9781846195556
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
 
 
Open futures, human finitude 
 
Martyn Evans 
 
 
 
 
Frail as summer’s flower we flourish 
Blows the wind and it is gone 
Yet while mortals rise and perish 
God endures unchanging on. 
Henry Francis Lyte 
 
 
In the long run we are all dead. 
John Maynard Keynes 
 
 
Introduction 
 
‘Looking forward’ is an ambiguous state in which to find oneself, as 
ambiguous as that future reality of which the looking-forward is a 
presentiment. Anticipation can be eager and excited (cats are said to enjoy 
the prospect of food as much as the food itself), but it can also be fearful (for 
instance, contemplation supplies the frightened soldier with full dress-
rehearsals of his death). For context is all. Prognosis usually concerns where 
illness may take us and where it may leave us. Often this can be entirely 
happy: the full recovery with years of active future life restored or confirmed. 
Or it can be sombre: striking the tempo of the introductory bars to an elegy 
for life diminished, darkened or soon-to-be-lost altogether. 
Prognosis is a coolly anticipatory dipping of the toe into time’s cold stream, 
best-guessing what the full plunge will be like. Of course its roots proclaim 
prognosis as fore-knowing. But there is something bordering on the 
contradictory in that idea: We know backwards; we rarely know forwards. 
More modestly, as a form of attempted fore-seeing, prognosis searches out 
glimpsed stages in the lived measures of time: becoming, fully being, 
diminishing, finishing. Its assumptions place disease, illness, recovery or 
 2 
decline within the usual course of uninterrupted life; and that course in turn 
consists in the single stanza of an imagined chorale, whose individual lines 
vary with our lives, but whose line-endings are ordinarily the same: 
 
Furnish: Relish: Languish: Perish 
 
Later on, I will return to the musical metaphor; but in introducing it one may 
be tempted to remark, as does Fingarette, that ‘Confucius’s vision of human 
life may be helpful to us because it compensates for a characteristic blindness 
from which we modern Westerners suffer – our blindness to the ceremonial 
dimension of social existence’.’1 This is perhaps not entirely fair; in Western 
Christendom chorales have for centuries expressed the measured tread of 
worshippers’ relationships with one another as well as with the eternal. But 
while our ceremonial forms, such as they are, aspire us to make selected 
words in some sense more present to us through music, those words’ 
meanings are typically attenuated rather than vivified in the process. The 
body – and let us not forget for a moment that prognosis is more securely tied 
to processes written within the body than it is to our experience of those 
processes – responds to and exhibits music more readily than words. One is 
reminded here of Wackenroder’s observation, quoted by Spitzer, that: 
 
Seasons, times of day, lives and destinies, are all, strikingly enough, 
thoroughly rhythmical, metrical, according to a beat. In all trades and 
arts, in all machines, in organic bodies, in our daily functions, 
everywhere: rhythm, meter, beat, melody.2  
 
But whether in prose or in music, the scale of our line-endings is normally too 
large for us to take in; instead we mark out the ground-metre of ordinary 
living in more manageable and prosaic ways. Often words do this well enough. 
Recall our patient Jen through the calendar she kept, upon which a chorale 
might readily be hung: 
 
Siskins today. Saw the wren! Visited Geoff. 
Hospital today. Dr Friend. 
Woodpecker. First this year. 
Woodpecker. First this year. 
 
Whatever their scale, the watermark of mortality runs through these plangent 
lines, through every event, every heartbeat. But mortality also implies life in 
every heartbeat. Perhaps it is just as well that it does. For whether by 
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temperament, or because life has to be lived in the present, we are generally 
only dimly aware of the larger stanzas, or of the life-celebrating chorale as a 
whole. In this chapter I would like to indulge our being thus ‘dimly aware’, for 
a little while. 
 
I The openness of the future 
 
We cannot see the future, although we can peer towards it. This is important 
for our present reflections because prognosis is, after all, future-orientated. 
We expect that, in the most general terms concerning the way the material 
world behaves, the future will resemble the past. Reasonably so. However, 
this expectation is limited in two ways. First, our understanding of the 
material world is highly incomplete, and the gaps affect our understanding of 
disease processes, of the full range of factors at stake in giving rise to them, 
and of different human bodies’ sometimes bafflingly variable responses to 
them. Second, our understanding of the material world can take only limited 
account of how our own actions and intentions and purposes affect future 
events – not least because we ourselves do not know precisely what we will 
do. My intention this afternoon was to complete a substantial portion of this 
very chapter during a period of time I had scheduled to devote to the task, 
and at lunchtime that prospect seemed a real one. It was overturned the 
moment that an unexpected knock at the door brought an equally unexpected 
problem with which I had to deal. Of course, this is the stuff of daily life: 
negotiated action, deferred intentions, unanticipated joyful encounters, the 
springing up of hidden obstacles or dangers, the fallibility of our bodies, our 
seemingly infinite distractibility. It has been said that the past is ‘another 
country’. Perhaps the future, so far as we can peer into it, is a land of 
possibilities of which some will come to pass in ways that we can deliberately 
influence – but can rarely control. 
The future is underdetermined by the past, then, and also by the present: It is 
‘open’ in a way that the past is not, nor even the rolling present, in which we 
continually act only to see those actions become instantly irretrievable – for 
all that we can often amend or mitigate their consequences. But the future is 
not boundlessly open. There are some things that simply cannot happen; 
there are some possibilities that are forever excluded. Jake can recall the 
moment at which his relationship with his first love, Carol, stood on a cusp – 
to bond, or to fissure – but he cannot retrieve it in order that he may now 
choose differently. I can never again lead the life of a young enquirer still at 
the point of discovering philosophical reflection with its entire repertoire of 
investigations, among which I could choose my speciality; I can never again 
look into a mirror and see the reflection of that hirsute, awkward youth whose 
cocky spirit somehow still ‘inhabits’ me in pale and complicated ways. (Or as 
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Joni Mitchell famously observed, no-one could ever say to Van Gogh, ‘Paint A 
Starry Night again, man.’1) This at least we can know of the future.  
And some things cannot happen yet. Processes of maturation – physical and 
existential alike – cannot be rushed, even when we can see to what they will 
lead. Patients may surprise us in the rate, as well as the extent, to which they 
can recover or be rehabilitated, but physical recovery takes time and 
emotional recovery may be circumscribed. If Rachel’s becoming a mother is 
really ever to stabilise her self-management of her insulin it will be from a 
future perspective that we can know it, not from the present. 
Prognosis has an intriguing relationship with hindsight. It is based (loosely, 
and with awkward philosophical reservations concerning induction3) upon our 
accumulating experiences, and particularising upon a known individual the 
general expectations arising from collectedly observed patients in the past. In 
that sense it rests upon hindsight. At the same time it defies hindsight 
because it gazes ahead, in either hope or discouragement as the case 
suggests. We can ‘read’ the patient’s life backwards, guessing at the causes 
and the reasons, the genes and the choices, that led to the present diagnosis – 
and to the need for the present prognosis. We cannot similarly ‘read’ the 
patient’s life forwards, except possibly in the most grievous cases where the 
clockwork of life’s end-stage is already running down (or running awry) 
beyond the point of meaningful intervention. 
Hindsight, moreover, is the reading of a history of possibilities foreclosed. 
‘With hindsight we might have acted differently,’ we commonly say – but it is 
never true in any meaningful sense, because at the time what we needed was 
not hindsight at all, but foresight. The fact is that we begin life with 
possibilities that, for the most part, diverged precisely because they excluded 
one another. One cannot be both the child who took up piano lessons and the 
child who did not. There was a point in time from which even to take up 
lessons a single week later is to become a different child: the child whose 
previous week has an irretrievably different history – and a different future 
influence – from the child who began at once. The differences may be 
indiscernible yet they accumulate. Our possibilities are added to as life 
proceeds: Opportunities come our way and we take them or decline them as 
the case may be. We enact a growing, and bewildering, variety of new 
potentials – physical and social and intellectual and emotional. 
And yet every choice and every ‘enacting’ excludes some other choices and 
acts; the ‘road not taken’ is testament to the road we actually chose. Our 
lives’ futures begin as, seemingly, illimitably broad potential and at a distance 
that from the child’s perspective appears unattainably distant. Yet a long 
heartbeat later and we are already looking back on a life largely accomplished. 
                                                     
1 In a recorded aside between songs, on her live album Miles of Aisles, Warner Music: 
Elektra/Asylum Records, 1974. 
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There are many tracks we may trace across our futures, but there can be only 
one track that, in the event, we did trace. Walking past what she takes to be 
the accusatory gaze of others, Rachel’s conviction that ‘she’d never escape the 
curiosity in those eyes’ is itself a kind of existential prognosis arising from her 
dawning sense of responsibility, one tied to her actions in the moment quite 
as securely as her medical prognosis is tied to her diabetes. And from that 
moment forward she carries both with her. Our present moments are the 
convergences of all that we in fact did – but also the divergences of all that we 
yet may do. The present is a lens, magnifying a moving point across a map: in 
front of it, a conjectural plot; behind it, an ineradicable trace. The future both 
opens out to us and closes upon us; over time, the closing down, the 
subtraction, can seem to dominate us. As we grow older, and as less time 
remains to us, then the convergences increasingly outweigh the divergences. 
Habit’s hand grasps us more tightly; shaking free (perhaps even wanting to 
shake free) becomes steadily less possible. 
But perhaps this is true more in a quantitative sense (the number, extent and 
duration of distinct opportunities) than in a qualitative sense. The moments 
remaining to us may become individually richer, more nuanced and more 
meaningful as they dwindle in sheer number. The musical phrasing of our lives 
begins in crescendo, and at some later time ends in diminuendo; yet life, like 
music, can intensify in the quietening simplicity of a coda’s concluding bars, 
and there are some very long and rich codas in music and life alike. 
 
II Defying our finitude 
 
The constraints upon the openness of the future are doubly poignant. Every 
choice taken is a multitude of other choices foregone, but in an illimitable 
ocean of lifespan this may not matter: The chief decision facing us would 
concern the order in which to undertake things, rather than which things we 
had time to undertake. But that possibility is denied us by our own finitude – 
the unpredictable yet unopposable limitations upon both our powers and the 
time available to us in which to exercise them. Acknowledging our finitude is 
the first step on the path of coming to terms with it, and prognosis in illness is 
an effective prompt to do so. 
Now the acknowledgement of finitude may confront many facets. Most 
obviously, there is the finitude of our just being – of our essential mortality 
(which prognosis always implicitly attempts to meter). Because mortality is 
essential to us, it is part of the meaning of ‘being human’. Thus it is more than 
simply our vulnerability: Some humans are more vulnerable than others, but 
none is more or less mortal than anyone else. This finitude in turn points to 
others. Our material being is certainly delimited, but it is imperfectly defined; 
the space our bodies occupy is co-inhabited, by ourselves and by the countless 
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microorganisms that live on and in us.4 We metamorphose continuously – 
gently over a day or a week, brutally over a lifetime. Even within its general 
envelope, our spatial finitude is malleable in detail – malleable by ourselves 
(as when by effort and will we purposefully develop our muscles) and 
malleable by disease processes of atrophy or neoplasia (as when cancer 
replaces cells that are ‘us’ with cells that are ‘not-us’). 
Of course, it is a difficult thing simply to be: Generally we are through how we 
engage with the world, be it actively or in contemplation. So (particularly in 
Western culture where our instincts for action ahead of contemplation form 
something of a fetish) it is salutary to remember the finitude of our acting – 
our portions of strength, stamina, talent and fortitude that will all one day run 
out and that must somehow be expended adventurously while also 
husbanded against the foreseeable needs of our later decline, what Larkin 
calls ‘the coming night’.5 The fatally unadventurous Jake has plenty of time for 
contemplation and action alike. He is a prisoner, not only (as he imagines) of 
his psoriasis, but (in truth) of his habits – ‘His hands were good now, but old 
habits died hard’ – in which habits of self-loathing and self-deprecation the 
particular forms of his finitude are largely self-generated. ‘What if [the 
treatment] stops working?’ he types, with shaking hands, daring prognosis to 
turn uncertainty into despair rather than into hope. Doubt is a fearful form of 
finitude if it is unreasoned and self-fulfilling. 
There is also the finitude of our spectating – our judging, enjoying, waiting and 
suffering. We are subject to finitude in them all, and that finitude is even 
merciful in some respects: It puts a limit upon suffering, such that the very 
things (the reality and symptoms of physical and mental frailty) that remind us 
of our finitude also constitute it and, in the end, relieve us through bringing it 
fully upon us. 
And, painfully, there is the finitude of our separation. We are of course social 
creatures – doubtless irreducibly so in language as well as in conduct6 – and 
yet we are still the individual loci of our own experiences of a notionally 
shared world. Hence the importance of both the fact, and the fragility, of our 
attempts to capture, express and convey our first-person experiences so that 
we are confident of being understood and recognised for who we are: 
whether we are falling in love, accounting for misdeeds or seeking support on 
the illness-journey. We continually ‘frame’ the world from a perspective that, 
at the time, no-one else can precisely occupy. The frame itself is a form (and 
indeed an archetype) of finitude, never precisely aligned with any other 
frame. Metaphors can enliven our descriptions, but they succeed only if they 
are grasped in something like the way we ourselves coined them. (And what is 
our criterion for knowing when that has happened? Merely prosaic 
agreement will never quite suffice.) We hope that what we say connects 
sufficiently well with another’s experience for them to recognise that 
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experience – or something like it – in us. A prognosis informed by shared 
experience may be no more certain than one that is not, but it may have 
additional resonance for the patient looking ahead at the very same 
uncertainties. We are meaning-making creatures and we try – perhaps 
because we need to try – to make some kind of meaning out of every 
experience. But we can be no more confident that others grasp the meanings 
that we make than we can be confident of grasping theirs, and that is a 
sobering thought. 
Most obviously of all, perhaps, is the finitude of our knowing. Prognosis, both 
a defiance of uncertainty and an attempt to map how far the future is open, 
perfectly exemplifies this finitude even in defying it. It may be true that ‘we 
know more than we can tell’,7 but it is also true that we know less than can be 
told. This is true in what I may call a ‘domestic’ sense, in the ordinary 
recognition that we cannot know beyond what we (or, via report, others) 
happen to have experienced. But it is true also in, for want of a better term, a 
more existential sense. The conditions under which it is possible for human 
experience to come about and be sustained, the general circumstances of our 
nature and the material reality we inhabit, are opaque to us. Too large, 
perhaps too terrifying, to do normal business with, such circumstances must 
be relegated to poetic and philosophical speculation in order that the ordinary 
conduct of ordinary life and ordinary illness and death may proceed. But given 
a moment’s respite from the routine, we sometimes sense that something is 
needed to lend meaning to the otherwise preposterous accident of human 
experience arising unbidden in a once-sterile material universe. Rachel’s 
having the child that she is determined to carry to term will challenge her 
management of her diabetes (amid much else, as every parent knows), and 
we do not know whether she will succeed. Liz, more timidly, contemplates 
pregnancy in the improbable company of an Internet forum – a near-perfect 
metaphor for our age of uncertainty. She will search in vain online for the 
prognosis she really wants, since her self-doubts have had longer to mature 
and they go deeper than her epilepsy. But even so, what is true for Rachel can 
be true for Liz, too: bringing into the world a new life is a peerlessly vivid – in 
all senses – route to defying finitude, for a time. 
Prognosis, by reminding us of our fleshly finitude, reminds us too of our 
existential finitude. Thus it sharpens our need to know that there may be 
something beyond or behind our existence (or at least our need to believe in 
it) – a need that is, of necessity, ‘unconsummated’ in ordinary life. Especially 
when a prognosis is unfavourable or grave, it sharpens our similarly 
‘unconsummated’ desire to transcend our circumstances. Perhaps it is above 
all in this sense that prognosis as fore-knowing is a kind of defiance of 
finitude. In his Summer Meditations Vaclav Havel suggests that it is actually 
rational, and intrinsic to human experience, to hope that there is more to life, 
and hence to reality, than the world of experience as we know it.8 If this be 
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true in general, how much more true is it when either natural age or prognosis 
in serious illness paint the nearness of approaching finitude? As Raymond 
Tallis puts it: 
 
The sense of finitude animates a desperate desire to make a deeper, 
more coherent, sense of things, to seize hold of it in its greatness, to be 
equal in consciousness to the great world on which we find ourselves, 
of which we are conscious in a piecemeal, sequential, fragmented, 
small-world way. The idea of death is a threat, a goad, and an 
inspiration. And its power is available to all of us who aim to live 
abundantly.9 
 
III The idea of the noumenal 
 
Recently I sat on a park bench in the sunshine in the otherwise almost 
deserted College grounds where I work, rued my torpid middle age (and the 
bones that no longer clamour for physical challenge but are disappointingly 
contented by the prospect of inactivity) and settled down to watch a tiny 
beetle crawling laboriously up a twig, over the edge of a leaf and along the 
leaf’s underside. It occurred to me that had I time, patience and refreshment, 
and were I to sit and watch for long enough, I may plausibly witness such a 
creature’s entire course of birth, life and death, and observe its every action – 
with little understanding on my part, of course, but with a certain existential 
sympathy that would outlive its six-legged object. Compared to my own 
consciousness, the beetle’s consciousness is not only more limited but vastly 
more fleeting. Such an ephemeral ‘consciousness’ would arise and disappear, 
vanishing forever in any subjective sense (if we can speak of a subject here): 
Vanishing as though it had never been, its only continued validation subsisting 
in the mind and continuing consciousness of the watcher. 
But, in the long run, it is the same for us, too. One day our consciousness will 
be as though it had never been, for all that our deeds may outlive us: Only the 
consciousnesses of those who survive us will validate the claim that behind 
our deeds lay not automata but thinking, experiencing, willing subjects as 
well. 
Bizarrely, we can glimpse this for ourselves at first hand in special 
circumstances, of which an example known to me personally produces what I 
will call the ‘midazolam problem’. Midazolam, a sedative/hypnotic from the 
benzodiazepine group of drugs, is notorious as Rohypnol, the ‘date-rape drug,’ 
for its memory-suppressant effect. Fortunately that very effect, so despicably 
used in sexual assault, is in other contexts therapeutically valuable. In 
particular it is invaluable in helping patients to endure unpleasant procedures 
 9 
that require from them sufficient consciousness as to be able to cooperate 
with the clinicians. Now I use the word ‘endure’ but this is problematic: For to 
endure something is, among other things, to experience it, and an important 
question arises over the status of experience in regard to any portion of 
conscious life of which no subjective trace remains. This is important in 
thinking about death, for in death, so far as we can tell, all subjective traces 
are removed of not just a portion but the entirety of a given conscious life. 
A personal clinical anecdote may bring out what is at stake. I was a few years 
ago obliged to have my insides explored by an endoscope (a flexible and 
steerable optical tube inserted into the body). It is a procedure that no-one 
could relish, but unfortunately it is one that requires an aware patient to 
respond to instructions, and hence is incompatible with anaesthesia in the 
ordinary sense. Pain-relieving drugs may also be offered as an adjunct, but 
sedation and amnesia are the primary comforts aimed at through midazolam. 
My encounter with this much-feared procedure, once I had somehow dragged 
my shivering green-gowned self onto the operating table, was in the event an 
entirely untroubled one, although baffling. The ensuing experience consisted 
wholly of conversation and nothing else: Lying on the table, I asked the 
surgeon whether he had administered the sedative sufficiently early for it to 
take full effect, and he replied that he certainly had, for it was being delivered 
intravenously. A nurse then immediately asked me whether I would like tea or 
coffee with my biscuit. I politely pointed out that this seemed very premature, 
and she politely rejoined that it was nothing of the kind since I was in the 
post-operative recovery room. And, unbelievably, I was – with the endoscopy 
apparently completed. (Moreover, within half an hour my wife and I were in a 
restaurant enjoying a hearty lunch.) Somehow this absurd suturing of a gash 
in time struck me in the moment of re-arousal as being amusing rather than 
shocking, and it took a little while for the philosopher in me to creep out from 
his trauma-evading refuge.  
I have since thought long and hard about what one can say of such a seamless 
‘book-ended’ gap in life – an ‘experiectomy’, as one may call it surgically. 
Subjectively, the inaccessibility to me of anything that happened while I was 
sedated is total, full-stop. Anything that I may have appeared to experience, 
to participate in, to respond to, while under sedation is now, and (I am 
convinced) was then, an appearance only for others, in their memory and in 
whatever other traces may persist of those events. Events are not in 
themselves experiences. Responses and behaviours are not in themselves 
experiences. My memories of what happened under sedation have not so 
much been washed away: Rather they were never laid down. And this 
complete inaccessibility of ‘what happened’ seems to me to be radical and 
significant. For me, subjectively, ‘what happened’ is now either a mere third-
person report – as though of an event not involving me, and that I never 
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witnessed – or it is annihilated, inasmuch as it was void from the outset. No 
continuing me was there to validate it. The only me involved is so completely 
sliced-off from the me of events before and since, that it may as well never 
have existed; indeed in no accessible sense did it ever exist. The sedation 
marks a perfect absence from the continuity of me – so thoroughly absent, so 
thoroughly without subjective validation, that what ‘happened’ under 
sedation never happened. 
It seems to me that death is like that with regard to the temporary bubble of 
conscious experience that we presently inhabit. Our traces will, for a while, 
constitute events remembered by, or later reported to, others, but that is all. 
In the vast eternity of darkness, experience flickers briefly: And during the 
flickering we can realise and articulate this conundrum, but we will be 
extinguished and the interruption to the darkness will be so completely 
annulled that it will be as if the flickering never happened. Indeed if all other 
flickerings – each capable to a small extent of recording and recalling the fact 
of neighbouring, overlapping flickerings of others – came to an end (And why 
should they not? Why should the phenomenon of organic consciousness 
persist indefinitely?) then its having happened will be indistinguishable from 
its not having happened. The distinction will have no meaning. 
I realise how pessimistic, how nihilistic, this sounds but it is not meant like 
that. I am not lamenting any of it; I am merely recognising it in that minor 
herald of individual annihilation that I met in my temporary self-interruption 
by midazolam. Death finds only a poor metaphor in sleep, as Fingarette has 
pointed out.10 But it seems to me that in chemical oblivion it finds a genuinely 
powerful one. That procedure’s importance lies in presenting to anyone who 
has undergone it without leaving any experiential trace, as in my own case, a 
vivid illustration of what the annihilation of experience actually means. 
Whatever ‘happened’ to me, however I responded (Was ‘I’ brave? Did ‘I’ cry 
out in pain or distress? Could the surgeon secure ‘my’ cooperation?) 
‘happened’ in no enduring sense except in the acts and the recollections of 
those around. The only guarantor of the events in question is the 
consciousnesses of others who were there; the ‘I’ who was there, if indeed 
‘he’ ever existed in any sense other than a purely behavioural one, was 
obliterated. 
Thus the ephemeral nature of my own conscious experience is made vivid and 
acute for me – without sadness or regret, but certainly as an object of 
wonder. So long as I am alive and conscious I can continue to assure and 
validate the reality of my subjective existence; but if there was a time before 
my conscious life and if there will be a time after it, it is assured and validated 
only in the consciousnesses of others. Hence, perhaps, our desire to think that 
a consciousness larger than our own could solve the problem of our own 
ephemeral nature. As individuals, we like to think that in some attenuated 
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sense we can exert our presence, even our will, beyond our material existence 
– in the memories of others and in the carrying out of our wishes, in the 
funeral rites and the reading and execution of our Wills, in our letters and 
writings and in any other traces that we may live and that may have influence 
on the lives of others after us. Of course the consciousness of a collective of 
others who are like us, and whose memories embrace us, is not always 
enough for us. Indeed, unless entropy can be indefinitely postponed, 
collective consciousness and shared memories will in the long run not be a 
sufficient guarantor of anyone’s ever having existed as a subjective reality. So 
some people imagine God, whose omni-consciousness covers every gap, now 
and always. Others imagine something else, through a kind of personification 
in art, philosophy, books and music, although these too would in the long run 
need an imprint on some eternal realm. At any rate it seems that it is the 
imagination that is our present refuge from finitude – an existential prognosis 
of the most speculative and supplicant kind. 
Of course even in writing this I am to some extent imagining here. Perhaps – 
even in philosophical conjecture – we are all compelled to imagine. Perhaps 
imagination is a condition of learning, which in turn requires our mastering 
the prognostic as well as descriptive and retrospective roles of language, 
grasping that what is properly said now can also properly be said, in the right 
circumstances, in the future. As Wittgenstein realised, we are marked out as 
language users proper when we can learn and take hold of the meaning, the 
coherent possibility, of the intensely prognostic phrase ‘and so on’.11 Often we 
appeal to the imagination to offer a glimpse beyond what we can know. 
Prognosis, too, is an act of imagination – a projection beyond what we 
immediately know, but based upon what we (and others) have known. It 
challenges a contingent type of finitude – we happen not yet to have seen 
where an illness is going to lead, but if we wait patiently we will do so, and the 
moving curtain that clarifies the extent of our finitude will roll onward a little 
way. 
But what of a projection beyond all that we could ever know, and based upon 
nothing we have ever known but merely upon the fact that we can know 
anything at all: a projection challenging a finitude that is total? Such 
conjectures, articulated or not, hover around us when we contemplate death 
as the only certainty in a future that is otherwise more or less open, 
depending upon the nature and confidence of our prognosis. The thought of 
complete finitude tempts us to suppose that something unknown, unseen, 
underlies the existence that is ours and with which we suppose we are 
familiar. We yearn to connect with something that will transcend our finitude, 
something whose power as Larkin put it ‘outbuilds cathedrals’;12 and if we 
cannot connect with it we nonetheless yearn to posit it and give it a name. 
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In fact this yearning is not without philosophical support. Kant11 and, later, 
Schopenhauer12 breathtakingly realised that since we know the world only 
through experience, the spatial and temporal and causal forms taken by that 
experience are a feature of our minds, not of the world itself independently of 
us. (As they appreciated, space, time and causation are the conditions of our 
experience and are found only where experience is found: that is, subjectively. 
See Magee for a beautifully accessible explanation of their thought.13,14) 
Necessarily, we cannot experience the formative processes and constraints 
themselves, only their consequences. 
Equally our daily experience of our own free will discloses an aspect of our 
own nature that can never itself be part of the empirical world described by 
science – there is no experience, no part of the observable world, that is ‘the 
willing’ or ‘the deciding’ to do something. We know that we do will and 
decide, but we cannot catch ourselves willing or deciding; all we can know are 
their observable consequences in the world describable by science. The world 
is, in short, only partially revealed to us in experience. Some part of it 
underlies that experience and, in underlying it, is beyond all possibility of 
being itself experienced. Astonishingly we ourselves, as willing agents capable 
of acting in the world, simultaneously inhabit both the empirical world of 
science and the larger reality that underlies the empirical world yet is not 
itself bounded by space, time or causal connection. That larger reality must be 
there – logically must – but we can never know it directly, although we can 
reason our way towards acknowledging it. 
In close (although not identical) progression of thought, Kant13 and 
Schopenhauer14 called this unknown the noumenal; although neither of them 
associated it with any kind of personal existence, the noumenal occupies a 
philosophical place that somewhat recalls the idea of an eternal realm familiar 
in religious thought, a realm that in some sense answers to our yearning for 
there to be something that transcends our own finitude. (The noumenal, 
incidentally, offers neither proof nor disproof of God’s existence.) We may or 
may not take comfort from the answer; notoriously, Schopenhauer himself 
did not. But if we do take comfort from it, that comfort is supported by 
philosophical reasons to regard the idea of the noumenal as logically more 
compelling than mere psychological palliation. 
Somehow as we get older, or as we brush more closely against illnesses that 
could one day be serious, we become more conscious of our finitude; we have 
more reason to wonder whether that finitude is total; and we become more 
conscious that the story of existence is our story, too, and not simply the story 
of those choirs of the dead who have preceded us. And this is a consequence 
not merely of serious prognosis: Any prognosis, even a happy one, is 
nonetheless a reminder of the continuity of our fleshly frailty and 
vulnerability; we are, after all, born with an indeterminate sentence of death. 
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When we reflect on this, the conjecture that reality may be somehow veiled 
starts to haunt us – whether we believe on the one hand that, on lifting a 
corner of the veil, we will glimpse the noumenal or, on the other, that we will 
confront nothing more than ‘the solving emptiness that lies beneath’.5 
 
IV A coda: echoes in music 
 
In this chapter prognosis, the medical act, has fallen into the role of flag-
bearer for how we look at, and face, future uncertainties of other kinds: Our 
finitude is guaranteed by our mortal nature, even while it is defied by our 
imaginations, so it is natural for medical prognosis to become almost a 
metonym for looking forward in an existential sense. 
Lakoff and Johnson, in their celebrated and now-classic study Metaphors We 
Live By,15 envisage the linguistic inevitability of structuring our depictions of 
the world around a framework of metaphor largely rooted in physical, spatial, 
experience. The level(!) on which metaphors operate(!) determines their 
visibility(!) (to use three more metaphors). The metaphorical uses of 
orientational terms such as ‘up’ and ‘down’ to refer to changes of extent, 
value, frequency, volume, intensity and so forth are so embedded (metaphor 
again) as virtually to merge (and again!) into the literal: They are simply 
unavoidable. But we can use metaphors and tropes more consciously than 
this, and sometimes we do so when literal descriptions are either dry to the 
point of futility, or imaginatively inaccessible. In our first Volume in this series, 
I drew on music and musicality as metaphors for the ordinary conduct of a 
modestly flourishing life.18 The ready availability of musical metaphors in 
many aspects of lived experience rests in part on the intense relationship 
between musical experience and embodiment (something that Mark Johnson 
draws out in some detail,19 true to his general grounding of metaphor in 
physical experience). I would like to return briefly to music-as-metaphor now 
in closing these remarks on prognosis. 
But first, a prefatory note. Music’s rich metaphorical resources have long been 
recognised, seized-upon, exploited and cultivated: Rhythm, harmony and 
melody all lend themselves readily to the task of characterising both what life 
is and what it may be, and in contexts ranging from the banalities of greeting-
card doggerel to the rarefied nuances of cultural history,2 as well as to the 
small change of lived experience (witness Anne Macleod’s memorable 
characterisation of Jen’s last hours ‘fighting that rasping symphony of failing 
breath’). In my own case I find music almost to out-grow its metaphorical role; 
to become at times almost the dominant partner, such that life’s events take 
on for me a quasi-musical form – life’s rhythms and developments and 
exigencies becoming forms of expression, among many other possible forms, 
of musical possibility. Indeed – however strange it may seem when written 
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down – I find it difficult to shake off the conviction that life, human-ness, 
human embodiment, are themselves forms of musicality amid the endless 
musical variety of the material Universe. (In partial defence, related 
convictions explosively animated some important philosophical reaction to 
the emergence of ‘absolute’ music in the nineteenth century, in the writings 
of Schelling, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Novalis among others.2) At any 
rate, it was in this spirit that I tried to convey the experience of serious illness 
in Volume 1, and try now to offer a few figurative thoughts on futures and 
finitude. 
First, I have noted more than once that the idea of prognosis – forward 
looking – reminds us of our mortality even when a given prognosis is friendly. 
Our declining years, in an ordinary life-span and given averagely satisfactory 
health, mark an autumnal period that can be thought of as either a cadence to 
a theme, or as the coda to that musical movement in which our life more 
largely consists. In our maturity we may expect to have become settled to the 
point of predictability in identity and purposes, habits and beliefs. Thus we 
depart from the settled notation of our lives either by way of a temporary, 
improvisatory diversion, a riff; or more extendedly, discovering or 
experimenting with previously unsuspected ideas and goals. New stories may 
emerge, unexpected insights and blossoming (although it is also true that, in 
improvisation, themes can also dreadfully unravel, before we realise it or can 
respond).  
Prognosis implies neither definite ending nor definite limitation – it does not 
‘wrap life up’ as Jane Macnaughton has put it – and we are normally able to 
keep open the possibility of new branchings, new ways of flourishing, even in 
our last years. A musical coda can be improvisatory; it does not, or at least 
need not, settle finally and fixedly the fate of the music’s motifs. From 
Beethoven’s innovations onward (fully half of the fourth movement of his 
Eighth Symphony is devoted to an extended and exploratory coda), the great 
symphonists would often experiment as much in a coda as in that same 
movement’s ‘official’ development section, and there is something infinitely 
rich about both musical and biographical subject-matter that defies the 
expectation of ordered closure that a coda, even a long coda, ordinarily 
brings. A coda can be a variation upon an existing theme within our lives; 
occasionally it can, almost experimentally, introduce new and wholly 
unexpected material. This is difficult to do convincingly; perhaps it is difficult 
in life, too – here, it may even be made possible by the provocation of an 
unexpected provocation, bringing the resources of a resolve to make the most 
of a lifespan that turns out to be foreseeably shorter than one had hoped. 
Now music relies on the openness of the future, and in a way that is almost 
playful. The structures of repetition and rhythm, and of established 
consonance and harmony, provide the stable backdrop across which melody is 
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drawn out. At the most basic level of listening, melody’s capacity to satisfy us, 
no less than its capacity to surprise us, relies upon our anticipating its 
direction (‘co-composing’ as we listen20) and having our expectations fulfilled 
or evaded as the case may be. 
Curiously, even repeated listenings, even to music that we know well, retain a 
reference to – or, better, a reliance upon – an open future. This is not simply 
because different performances or interpretations of the same work can 
produce substantially distinct listening experiences, but (I think, more 
fundamentally) because ‘the same’ music is always what it is against the 
backdrop of unnumbered alternative possible pathways through the same 
marvellous matrix of other possible harmonies, melodies and rhythmic 
complexities. Western diatonic music has been exploited abundantly for more 
than four centuries and yet it is still capable of new possibilities; an obituary 
for the late Benjamin Britten praised him for his capacity to write original 
tunes ‘in C major’ (standing for music’s most well-ploughed furrow); Jason 
Robert Brown’s contemporary musical The Last Five Years is musically fresh 
and inventive within a harmonic vocabulary that would still have been found 
recognisable by Bach and comfortable by Schumann. Music continually 
suggests the re-opening of the future. 
But music is not boundlessly open (indeed it has even been suggested, 
apocryphally, that ‘All great music is inevitable’). In this sense music relies also 
upon important finitudes – those necessary for the stability of recognisable 
forms, genres and traditions, and necessary for the boundaries and framing 
that are entailed by the very notion of structure, musical or otherwise. 
Complex structures such as sonata form rely on future expectations that are 
partially bounded because we know in advance the general sort of things that 
we should expect if the music is to count as sonata form. Not boundlessly 
open, then – yet still substantially open because there are indefinitely many 
different ways in which those expectations can be met, or flouted. Indeed one 
of the most satisfying moments in a sonata-form movement, the arrival of the 
recapitulation after the development section, is psychologically powerful to 
the extent that we are both prepared for it and yet surprised by it. 
It is also crucially true that music begins and ends in silence (as, presumably, 
does conscious life) and this ‘framing’ silence marks the very finitude that 
gives a piece of music its very identity, let alone its value. I suspect that the 
idea of unending music would be meaningless or at best pointless; music’s 
finitude is essential to its having, in the case of any given piece of music, 
either direction or completeness. One is tempted to feel that this is true of a 
life, too – whether it be one that flourished or one that languished. We cannot 
really imagine what an unbounded life could mean; still less can we imagine 
living it. 
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Spitzer reminds us that melody was for Nietzsche ‘primary and universal’; that 
Novalis conceived the soul as ‘acoustic’.21 But in noting that Schopenhauer 
saw melody as ‘linking man and nature’ he seriously understates the case. 
Schopenhauer, as Magee makes clear, regarded music as 
 
a direct manifestation of the noumenal. Just as the phenomenal 
[familiar, material] world is the self-manifestation of the noumenal in 
experience, so is music. It is the voice of the metaphysical will.22 
 
It is perhaps tempting to dismiss this as meaningless, as bizarre, or as 
unmanageably obscure. Schopenhauer himself knew that he was condemned 
to use language somewhat figuratively. I have already admitted that music’s 
relation to life is for me more than metaphorical – or that the metaphor’s 
direction does not lead necessarily from music to life, but rather that life 
sometimes seems to me to be an instance of music’s possibilities. On first 
hearing, at the age of 54 years, the opening bars of Bach’s ‘St Anne’ Prelude 
for organ I realised that all of the elements of diatonic music, which have for 
my whole life been the constituents of my inmost strainings and struggles, my 
regalings and revelries, were being properly disclosed, announced, to me for 
the first time. It was as if light had de novo fallen upon an open book, in which 
the workings of an ordered Universe were vouchsafed. There was nothing 
personal in this – in that sense this was no individual prognosis. And our 
individual finitude – a fleeting spark of awareness-of-being, wholly 
adventitious in a material Universe, validated by nothing, un-extendable, 
ultimately un-shareable – was no less incomprehensible or absurd. The 
absurdity seemed, however, less important. The future was indeed open, its 
terms drawn in musical possibility. 
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